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compared to the energy involved in the entire act of, say, raising one's hand
to vote. When an engineer throws a switch to release the water behind
Hoover Dam, the vast amount of potential energy unleashed by the moving
water is overwhelmingly greater than that involved in the engineer throwing
the switch. It may be the same with libeliarian acts. Perhaps the energy
released in the exercise of active power is miniscule compared to the potential energy released in the body as part of the relevant causal pathway. I just
don't lmow. Second, even if one opts for this second option (the release of
energy is virtually undetectable), it doesn't follow that the resulting gap
would not be detectable, since the effects of a libertarian act could still be
quite different in a "gappy" way from what would have followed in the
absence of that act.
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In what must be a brief response to broad objections, I will COlmnent
only cursOlily to most of the points made by Evan Fales. It is not that they
do not deserve an extended response, but that they are old points which have
already been sufficiently answered.
That naturalism, for example, can produce an objectivist ethic is obvious, but only in the sense that all human behaviors are causally related to an
actual biological and social evolutionary process. This, however, cannot
account for an objectively binding set of objective values.'
The rejection of my examples of fine-tuning is no more than an ad
hominem. It fails to add anything of substance to the extensive conversation
here.
The use of multiple worlds to diminish improbability has also been
given sufficient response. William A. Dembski, for example, has noted that
one cannot "invent probabilistic resources simply to prop an otherwise failing chance hypothesis.'" While it is celiainly an interesting hypothesis,

I See, for example, the exchange between Michael Martin and Paul Copan in Philosophia
Christi, Series 2, 1.2 (1999):45, and 2.1 (2000):75-91.
, William A. Dembski, The Design Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998),215. Dembski refers to this as the inflationary fallacy. It is, I would say, a close relative
to committing the same category mistake as the gambIer's fallacy.
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there is not a shred of evidence for it and it does not appear to be logically
sustainable.'
Two objections do, however, demand a bit more discussion, namely
those in reference to my use of the cosmological argument. Both of Fales's
points, regarding the need for a principle of causality, as well as the demand
for an explanation of God's initial choice, fail to recognize the true nature of
the Aristotelian/Thomistic argument. Most recent discussion has been concemed with the Leibnizian or "sufficient reason" argument, and within that
context both of Fales's objections are relevant but have also received sufficient responses.
Aristotle's argument, however, depends on the nature of contingency
and necessity. Its principle of causality is a descriptive generalization! It is
the denial of an infinite regress that is crucial in demanding a necessaty
being, not a necessaty principle of sufficient reason. And to ask for an
accounting of the first and necessaty cause misses the point of its necessity.s
Thus it yields the concept of divine omnidetennination. 6
One last note: Fales seems to miss the real function of the chapter. Its
purpose within the context of the book was not to prove God's existence
simpliciter, but to show that the usual arguments yield the sort of being to
whom it would make sense to attribute miracles. Of course, this is not an
excuse for bad arguments, but it was not my intent to state a case for God's
existence. Fales is clearly right that that could not be done adequately in
thirteen pages. Nor do I presume that these comments could deliver anything like a sufficient response. But I see nothing in Fales's objections that
has not already been sufficiently answered in the recent literature.

] One of the most informative discussions of this issue in the context of the argument for
God's existence is in William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang
Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) .
., See the discussion by Rohert Koons, "A New Look at the Cosmological Argument,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (1997): 193-211.
5 This point is well made recently in many places. See for example, Patterson Brown,
"Infinite Causal Regression," Philosophical Review 75 (1996): 510-25; Giovanni Blandino,
"The Existence of God: The Proof from Contingent Beings to the Absolute Being," Aquinas 38
(1995): 529-52; Norris Clarke, "Natural Theology Today," in Physics, Philosophy and
Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding, ed. Robert Russell, William Stoeger, and
George Coyne (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988); Stephen Davis, God, Reason
and Theistic Proofs (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmanns, 1997); and Norman Kretzmann,
"Aquinas's Disguised Cosmological Argument," in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality:
Philosophy of'Religion Today, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD:
Rowan and Littlefield, 1996).
(, See William Alston, "God's Action in the World," in Evolution and Creation, ed. Ernan
McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985).

